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Abstract. We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from
dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether
minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal
share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of their most preferred candidates is the
measure of majority power, and the minimal share of voters that allows them to veto each
of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on
these minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and in real elections.
We order these rules according to majority power and veto power. The instant-runoff voting
has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power and the plurality rule has
the lowest. In general, the higher the majority power of a voting rule is, the higher its veto
power. The three exceptions are: voting with proportional veto power, Black’s rule, and
Borda rule, which have a relatively low level of majority power and a high level of veto
power and thus provide minority protection. Our results can shed light on how voting rules
provide different incentives for voter participation and candidate nomination.
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1. Introduction
Majority tyranny has been a buzzword for centuries and can be traced back to the ancient
Greek ochlocracy. A more modern yet classical reference is the work of James Madison:
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will
be insecure. (Federalist 51.)
In this paper we propose a simple way to quantitatively measure the robustness of a voting
rule to majority tyranny or, more mildly, majority power, that is, the extent to which this
rule allows a majority to dictate the outcome of an election regardless of the minorities’
opinion and voting strategy.
Consider the following illustrative example presented in Table 1. Let there be five candi-
dates: Bernie, Donald, Hillary, John and Ted, and let the voters have one of the five rankings
of the candidates, with the top row giving the share of these voters in the population. Here,
as also throughout the paper, the total number of voters is arbitrary.
Table 1. Preference profile
share of voters 22% 21% 18% 19% 20%
1st candidate Hillary Donald John Ted Bernie
2nd candidate John John Ted Bernie John
3rd candidate Bernie Ted Bernie John Ted
4th candidate Ted Bernie Donald Donald Hillary
5th candidate Donald Hillary Hillary Hillary Donald
Notes: All characters and numbers in this example are fictitious.
Let us look at the voters in the last three columns in Table 1. These voters constitute
a mutual majority of 57% as they prefer the same subset of candidates (Bernie, John,
and Ted) over all other candidates. Depending on the voting rule, this 57% may be enough
to guarantee that one of the three candidates will win. For example, it is enough for the
instant-runoff voting. According to this rule, from each ballot we iteratively delete the
candidate with the fewest top positions. John is deleted first, followed by Bernie, then
Donald, then Hillary, and the winner is Ted.1 In contrast, the plurality rule makes Hillary
the winner, and the plurality with runoff deletes each candidate except for the two with the
most top positions (Donald and Hillary) and thus makes Donald the winner.
Formally, a voting rule satisfies the (q, k)-majority criterion if whenever a group of k
candidates get top k positions among a qualified mutual majority of more than q voters then
the rule must select one of these k candidates. For a given voting rule, the (q, k)-majority
criterion measures its majority power: the lower the quota q, the more the rule empowers
the majority.
1The instant-runoff is a special case of the single transferable vote (STV) when we select a single winner.
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The (q, k)-majority criterion subsumes few criteria known in the literature. Themajority
criterion requires that a candidate top-ranked by more than half of the voters is declared
the winner. This criterion is equivalent to (q, k)-majority criterion with k = 1 and a fixed
quota q = 1/2. When we consider a mutual majority that top-ranks some k candidates then
themutual majority criterion requires that one of these k candidates wins. This criterion
is equivalent to (q, k)-majority criterion with an arbitrary k and a fixed quota q = 1/2.
The previous literature studied majority power by partitioning the voting rules into three
categories: (1) rules that do not satisfy the majority criterion, (2) rules that satisfy the
majority criterion but not the mutual majority criterion, and (3) rules that satisfy the
mutual majority criterion (see Fig. 1).
Category (1) has the smallest majority power as these rules do not guarantee a majority
that their k = 1 top candidate wins. This category includes the proportional veto core
(Moulin, 1981, 1982, 1983) and positional scoring rules like the Borda rule (Baharad and
Nitzan, 2002; Nitzan, 2009). In contrast, category (3) has the largest majority power, as even
a simple majority (q ≥ 1/2) is enough to vote through one of its top-ranked candidates; a
review of these results can be found, for example, in Tideman (2006). However, these criteria
are black-or-white and do not allow a finer analysis of majority power. Our quantitative
criteria fill this gap.
Among all voting rules of interest, the most important are perhaps the plurality rule and
the plurality with runoff rule. Together with the instant-runoff these voting rules are most
widespread in political elections around the world.2 Interestingly, these three voting rules
are comparable in terms of majority power in an arbitrary setting. The instant-runoff voting
makes the majority extremely powerful and has a constant quota q = 1/2 as it satisfies the
mutual majority criterion. We show that the plurality with runoff makes the majority less
powerful, q = max{k/(k+2), 1/2}, while the plurality rule empowers the majority the least
among these three rules, q = k/(k + 1).
In our example presented in Table 1, k = 3 and thus in order to guarantee a victory to one
of the preferred candidates the share of voters must be more than 60% under the plurality
with runoff and more than 75% under the plurality rule. In the example, however, the share
is only 57%, which is not enough to guarantee a victory for either John, Bernie or Ted under
these two voting rules.
2A version of plurality with runoff – two-round system – is used for presidential elections in France and Russia.
The US presidential election system with primaries also resembles the plurality with runoff rule given the
dominant positions of the two political parties. The instant-runoff voting is currently used in parliamentary
elections in Australia and presidential elections in India and Ireland. According to the Center of Voting and
Democracy (fairvote.org, 2009) the instant-runoff and plurality with runoff rules have the highest prospects
for adoption in the US. In the UK, a 2011 referendum proposing a switch from the plurality rule to the
instant-runoff voting lost when almost 68% voted No.
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Higher veto power 
Rules satisfying mutual 
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Rules not satisfying 
majority criterion 
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RUNOFF 
BORDA 
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majority criterion, 
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Figure 1. Majority power and veto power: partial comparison of voting rules
Notes: Black dots represent voting rules. Arrows go from rules that have lower majority power and lower
veto power to the rules that have higher power in an arbitrary setting. The exact positioning of the rules is
based on authors’ interpretation of tables 3, 4, 5, 6 for different settings. Simpson’s rule and Young’s rule
always have the same majority power and veto power.
As an additional simple illustration of the quotas, consider how these three voting rules
give different incentives for candidate nomination. A leading party (or a coalition) that
has the support of at least half the voters decides whether to nominate two candidates in
a general election or run primaries and nominate a single candidate. Under the plurality
with runoff, the party is safe to forgo primaries and nominate both candidates.3 Under the
instant-runoff voting this is also the case; moreover, this party can safely nominate more
than two candidates. But under the plurality rule, unless the party has the support of at
least 2/3 of voters, it has to run primaries and can only nominate a single candidate.
The summary of our main results (see Theorem 1 to 11) is presented in Fig. 1. We
focus on the voting rules that are popular in the literature and do not satisfy the mutual
majority criterion, finding the minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q for each of
these rules. In Fig. 1 the voting rules are ranked in increasing order of majority power: each
3For example, this is done in non-partisan blanket primaries in the US, which is a version of plurality with
runoff.
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arrow goes from a rule with a larger minimal quota to a rule with a smaller minimal quota.4
Interestingly, while for a small number of preferred candidates k we get only partial order,
as shown in Fig 1, whenever k > 4 and the total number of candidates m is arbitrary we
get a complete majority power order over the rules (see the x-axis in Fig. 1 and Table 3 for
details).
Our analysis allows us to ask a question that is dual to majority power – the question of
veto power. Imagine there is a group of voters that dislike a group of l candidates and give
them the lowest ranks in an arbitrary order. In our example presented in Table 1 we have
two such groups: 58% of voters dislike Hillary (l = 1), while 57% of voters dislike Hillary
and Donald (l = 2). The question is: are these groups large enough to prevent each of these
l candidates from winning?
Formally, a voting rule satisfies the (q, l)-veto criterion if any group of a size larger than
q can always veto each of these l candidates. For a given voting rule, the (q, l)-veto criterion
measures its veto power: the lower the quota q is, the higher its veto power.
The veto criterion generalizes the majority loser criterion known in the literature. The
majority loser criterion requires that when more than half the voters give the same
candidate the lowest rank then this candidate does not win. This criterion is equivalent to
the (q, l)-veto criterion with l = 1 and q = 1/2.
Based on the (q, l)-veto criterion, we get the same partial order as in the case of the
(q, k)-majority criterion (Fig. 1). For example, the instant-runoff voting gives the highest
veto power, the plurality rule gives the lowest veto power, and the plurality with runoff rule
is in-between. This is not surprising due to duality: for a given number of candidates m, a
group that vetoes its l least preferred candidates at the same time guarantees that one of
their k = m− l most preferred candidates wins.5
However, when we consider the (q, l)-veto criterion for an arbitrary total number of candi-
dates m then the order of the voting rules is different from the order for the (q, k)-majority
criterion. Whenever l > 2 the complete order based on veto power is presented in Table 5
and shown on the y-axis in Fig. 1.
Based on our two criteria, the instant-runoff voting is the most powerful rule both from the
majority power viewpoint and the veto power viewpoint. Since the votes are transferable, a
simple majority of voters that like the same candidates can ensure the win of one of these
candidates. Similarly, if a simple majority dislikes the same candidates then none of these
candidates wins. Thus, the instant-runoff voting protects simple majorities. At the other
4More specifically, the comparison is made for a given setting: for each given total number of candidates m
and each given number of preferred candidates k we find the minimal size of qualified mutual majority
q(k,m).
5Due to this duality, the (q, k)-majority criterion and the (q, l)-veto criterion can together be referred to as
the qualified mutual majority criterion.
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extreme, the plurality rule appears to have a relatively low level of majority power and veto
power.
Perhaps surprisingly, the tradeoff between majority power and veto power has three ex-
ceptions. Among all voting rules, the proportional veto core,6 Black’s rule,7 and the
Borda rule provide a balanced combination of properties: relatively low majority power
and high veto power. Thus, these three rules are the best to protect minorities. In section 4
we discuss why these three rules are exceptional in our framework.
Throughout the paper we ignore strategic issues and treat the set of candidates, the set
of voters, and their preferences as fixed.8 Nevertheless, our two criteria and the results have
another interpretation: they can shed light on how voting rules differ in their incentives for
voter participation. Consider an election where a mutual majority of size q top-ranks
some k candidates. If the minimal quota of a given rule is lower than q then minorities
cannot do much. At most, minorities can influence which of the top-ranked k candidates
is selected,9 but any other candidate has zero chance of winning regardless of the minority
vote. This can discourage minorities from participating, thereby making the relative size of
the mutual majority larger and minorities smaller and weaker, causing positive feedback.
In contrast, when the minimal quota is larger than q then minorities have a larger influence
on the election and hence have stronger incentives to participate. If it causes minorities to
show up more then their relative size becomes larger again, causing positive feedback.
A similar participation argument can be deduced from the veto criterion. For instance, in
a given election let the ruling party nominate l candidates (when l = 1 this candidate can
be the incumbent), and let the opposition nominate their own candidates. The opposition
supporters do not necessarily agree on their most preferred candidate, but they agree that
the nominees of the ruling party are the worst. Then, a voting rule with low veto power
(i.e., high minimal quota) discourages opposition supporters from participating, while a rule
with high veto power (i.e., low minimal quota) provides stronger incentives to participate.
The two participation arguments have opposite implications. The veto power argument
predicts that the voting rules with low quotas encourage the participation of opposition
supporters who dislike the same candidates, while the majority power argument suggests
that such rules discourage the minorities from struggling with a mutual majority.
As an example, consider the case of the instant-runoff voting. The common opinion of the
social choice literature is that the instant-runoff voting promotes participation. Indeed, when
6In this rule each group of voters can veto the share of candidates that is approximately the same as the
share of this group. The rule selects the candidates that have not been vetoed by any group.
7Black’s rule selects a Condorcet winner (aka pairwise majority winner) if it exists and a Borda winner
otherwise.
8The literature on strategic voting is prolific; see e.g., Kondratev and Mazalov (2019) and references therein.
9In fact, they might be unable to even do this. In our example presented in Table 1, under the instant-runoff,
the 43% minority prefers John but John is deleted first.
MEASURING MAJORITY POWER AND VETO POWER OF VOTING RULES 7
minorities face a larger group of voters with a single preferred candidate then the instant-
runoff allows the minorities to transfer their votes instead of wasting them (Tideman, 1995;
Zwicker, 2016). However, if minorities face a mutual majority with more than one preferred
candidate then the instant-runoff works in favor of this majority.
Overall, we abstain from normative judgment and cannot say which voting rule is the best
based on the two criteria that we propose. These two criteria are instruments that should
be used at the discretion of a mechanism designer, as such decisions always involve tradeoffs.
We arrive at some of these tradeoffs when we study the compatibility of the (q, k)-majority
criterion (and the (q, l)-veto criterion) with other axioms; these results are presented in
subsection 3.4.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the definitions of the
voting rules. In section 3 we analyze our two criteria for the voting rules and the relevant
tradeoffs. A non-technical reader who understands the two criteria may safely skip these two
sections, only taking a look at tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and proceed to section 4 which concludes
with a discussion of the results and the open questions. The proofs are presented in the
Appendix.
2. Model
2.1. Voting Problem. This subsection introduces the standard voting problem and the
main criteria for voting rules.
Consider a voting problem where n ≥ 1 voters I = {1, . . . , n} select one winner among
m ≥ 1 candidates (alternatives) A = {a1, . . . , am}. Let L(A) be the set of linear orders
(complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relations) on the set of candidates A.
Each voter i ∈ I is endowed with a preference relation i∈ L(A). (Voter i prefers a
to b when a i b.)
Preference relation i corresponds to a unique ranking bijection Ri : A → {1, . . . ,m},
where Rai is the relative rank that voter i gives to candidate a,
Rai = |{b ∈ A : b i a}|+ 1, a ∈ A, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The collection of the individual preferences  = (1, . . . ,n) ∈ L(A)n as well as the
corresponding ranks (R1, . . . , Rn) are referred to as the preference profile. (There exist
m! different linear orders and (m!)n different profiles.)
Example 1. Table 2 provides an example of a preference profile for n = 100 voters over
m = 4 candidates. Here, voters are assumed to be anonymous, which allows us to group
voters with the same individual preferences. Each column represents some group of voters,
with the number of voters in the group in the top row; the candidates are listed below
(starting from the most preferred candidate) according to the preference of the group.
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Table 2. Preference profile, tournament matrix, and positional matrix
29 28 22 21
a b c c
b a d d
c c a b
d d b a
a b c d
a 51 57 57
b 49 57 57
c 43 43 100
d 43 43 0
Rank a b c d
1 29 28 43 0
2 28 29 0 43
3 22 21 57 0
4 21 22 0 57
Given a preference profile, we determine function h(a, b) as the number of voters that
prefer candidate a over candidate b,
h(a, b) = |{i : a i b, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|, a, b ∈ A, a 6= b.
Matrix h with elements h(a, b) is called a tournament matrix. (Note that h(a, b) =
n− h(b, a) for each a 6= b.)
Table 2 provides the tournament matrix for the profile in Example 1.
We say that candidate a wins in a pairwise comparison to candidate b, if h(a, b) > n/2.
For some subset B ⊆ A, a candidate is called a Condorcet winner (de Condorcet,
1785),10 if he/she wins in a pairwise comparison to each candidate in this subset. Thus, the
set of Condorcet winners is
CW (B) = {b ∈ B : h(b, a) > n/2 for each a ∈ B \ b}, B ⊆ A.
It is easy to see that the set of Condorcet winners CW is either a singleton or empty.
For the preference profile in Table 2, candidate a is the Condorcet winner.
Similarly, we say that candidate a weakly wins in a pairwise comparison to candi-
date b, if h(a, b) ≥ n/2. For some subset B ⊆ A, a candidate is called a weak Condorcet
winner if he/she weakly wins in a pairwise comparison to each candidate in this subset.
Let a positional vector of candidate a be vector n(a) = (n1(a), . . . , nm(a)), where nl(a)
is the number of voters for whom candidate a has rank l in individual preferences,
nl(a) = |{i : Rai = l, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|, a ∈ A, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The definition implies that each positional vector has non-negative elements, nl(a) ≥ 0 for
each l, and the sum of elements is equal to the number of voters
m∑
l=1
nl(a) = n.
Candidate a is called a majority winner, if n1(a) > n/2. Similarly, candidate a is called
a majority loser if nm(a) > n/2.
A collection of positional vectors for all candidates is called a positional matrix n() =
(n(a1), . . . , n(am)).
Table 2 provides the positional matrix for the profile in Example 1.
10The collection (McLean and Urken, 1995) contains English translations of original works by Borda, Con-
dorcet, Nanson, Dodgson, and other early researches.
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A mapping C(B,) that to each nonempty subset B ⊆ A and each preference profile 
gives a choice set is called a voting rule (or social choice rule),11
C : 2A \ ∅ × L(A)n → 2A,
where C(B,) ⊆ B for any B; and C(B,) = C(B,′), whenever preference profiles ,′
coincide on B.
A rule is called universal if C(B,) 6= ∅ for any nonempty B and any profile . For
instance, the Condorcet rule CW (B,) is not universal.
Let us define the criteria that are critical for the results of the paper and the voting rules
considered below.12
Majority criterion. For each preference profile, if some candidate a is top-ranked by
more than half the voters (n1(a) > n/2) then the choice set coincides with this candidate.
Mutual majority criterion.13 For each preference profile, if more than half the voters
give to some k candidates (B = {b1, . . . , bk}, 1 ≤ k < m) top k ranks in an arbitrary order
then the choice set is included in B.
Majority loser criterion.14 For each preference profile, if some candidate a is bottom-
ranked by more than half the voters (nm(a) > n/2) then the choice set excludes this candi-
date.
For any fixed quota q ∈ (0, 1) and any fixed number of preferred candidates k among the
total of m candidates, we define the next criteria.
(q, k,m)-majority criterion.15 For each preference profile with a total of m candidates,
if a share of voters higher than q gives to some k candidates (B = {b1, . . . , bk}, 1 ≤ k < m)
top k ranks in an arbitrary order then the choice set is included in B.
For a given q, k, we say that a rule satisfies (q, k)-majority criterion if it satisfies
(q, k,m)-majority criterion for each m.
11Any social choice rule is a voting rule. There exist voting rules that are not social choice rules; for example,
approval voting, preference approval voting (Brams, 2009), and majority judgement (Balinski and Laraki,
2011).
12The “extremely desirable” criteria of universality, non-imposition, anonymity, neutrality, unanimity are
satisfied by all voting rules considered in this paper (Fischer et al., 2016; Taylor, 2005; Tideman, 2006;
Zwicker, 2016).
13Mutual majority criterion is implied by a more general axiom for multi-winner voting called Droop-
Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (Woodall, 1997).
14For a voting rule, the majority criterion is satisfied if and only if the absolute majority winner paradox
never occurs. For a voting rule, the majority loser criterion is satisfied if and only if the absolute majority
loser paradox never occurs (Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2018; Diss et al., 2018).
15(q, k,m)-majority criterion is even more general than the concept q-PSC formalized by Aziz and Lee (2017)
if the latter is applied to single-winner elections. The weak mutual majority criterion defined by Kondratev
(2018) is a particular case of q = k/(k + 1). Also, q-majority decisiveness proposed by Baharad and Nitzan
(2002) is a particular case of k = 1. A somewhat similar approach but for q-Condorcet consistency is
developed by Baharad and Nitzan (2003), Courtin et al. (2015), and Mahajne and Volij (2018). All these
approaches are based on worst-case analysis.
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For a given q, we say that a rule satisfies q-mutual majority criterion if it satisfies
(q, k)-majority criterion for each k.
For universal voting rules, it is also apparent from the definitions that the mutual major-
ity criterion implies the majority criterion; for any k,m and any q′ ≥ q, (q, k,m)-majority
criterion implies (q′, k,m)-majority criterion; the majority criterion is equivalent to (1/2, 1)-
majority criterion; the mutual majority criterion is equivalent to (1/2, k)-majority criterion
with arbitrary k; the majority loser criterion is equivalent to (1/2,m− 1,m)-majority crite-
rion.16
2.2. Voting Rules. This subsection presents the definitions of the voting rules that satisfy
the majority criterion but do not satisfy the mutual majority criterion. We also consider
monotonic scoring rules that generally do not satisfy the majority criterion.
In the plurality voting rule the candidate that receives the most top positions is declared
the winner,
Pl(A,) = {a ∈ A : n1(a) ≥ n1(b) for each b ∈ A \ a}.
The plurality with runoff (RV) voting rule proceeds in two rounds: first, the two
candidates with the most top positions are determined, then, the winner is chosen between
the two using the simple majority rule.
According to Simpson’s rule (1969), aka maximin voting rule (see also Young, 1977),
each candidate receives a score equal to the minimal number of votes that this candidate
gets compared to any other candidate,
Si(a) = min
b∈A\{a}
h(a, b),
and the winner is the candidate with the highest score.
The Young score of candidate a is defined as the smallest number n′ such that there is
a set of n′ voters such that a is a weak Condorcet winner when those n′ voters are removed
from the election (Young, 1977; Caragiannis et al., 2016). All candidates with the lowest
Young score in a given election are its Young winner(s).
According to the Condorcet least-reversal rule (CLR) (aka the simplified Dodgson
rule, see Tideman, 2006) the winner is, informally, the candidate a ∈ A that needs the
least number of reversals in pairwise comparisons in order to become a Condorcet winner.
Formally, the winner d minimizes the following sum of losing margins compared to each
candidate c:
(1) pCLRd =
∑
c∈A\d
max
{n
2
− h(d, c), 0
}
.
16Also, one can see that the unanimity criterion is equivalent to (1−ε, 1)-majority criterion with an infinitely
small ε > 0.
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The Dodgson score of candidate a is the smallest number of sequential exchanges of
adjacent candidates in preference orders such that after those exchanges a is a Condorcet
winner (Dodgson, 1876; McLean and Urken, 1995; Caragiannis et al., 2016). All candidates
with the smallest Dodgson score are the Dodgson winner(s).
The proportional veto core is defined as follows (Moulin, 1981, 1983). For a given profile
with n voters andm candidates, a candidate a is not stable if some coalition of t voters blocks
him. Blocking means that there is a subset B of candidates such that each of the t voters
prefers each candidate b ∈ B over candidate a and B is large enough, |A \B| < m · t/n.
The proportional veto core consists of all stable candidates.
Under theBorda rule (de Borda, 1781; McLean and Urken, 1995), the first-best candidate
in an individual preference gets m− 1 points, the second-best candidate gets m− 2, . . . , the
last gets 0 points.
The total Borda score can be calculated using the positional vector n(a) as follows:
(2) Bo(a) =
m∑
i=1
ni(a)(m− i), a ∈ A.
The candidate with the highest total score wins. The score can also be calculated using
the tournament matrix:
(3) Bo(a) =
∑
b∈A\{a}
h(a, b), a ∈ A.
Black’s rule (1958) selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist
then the candidate with the highest Borda score (3) is selected.
In a non-generalized scoring rule each of m candidates is assigned a score from
s1, . . . , sm for a corresponding position in a voter’s individual preference and then the scores
are summed up over all voters.17 In the paper, we consider monotonic scoring rules in
which s1 > sm and s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. The plurality rule and the Borda rule are monotonic
scoring rules with the scores s1 = 1, s2 = . . . = sm = 0 and s1 = m−1, s2 = m−2, . . . sm = 0,
respectively.
Inverse plurality rule (aka anti-plurality rule or negative voting) is a monotonic
scoring rule with the scores s1 = . . . = sm−1 = 1, sm = 0.
If the difference in scores is positive and nondecreasing from position m to position 1, that
is, 0 < sm−1−sm ≤ sm−2−sm−1 ≤ . . . ≤ s1−s2, then a rule will be called a convex scoring
rule. For instance, the Borda rule is a convex scoring rule.
17In each generalized scoring rule, tie-breaking is performed using a sequence of non-generalized scoring rules
(Smith, 1973; Young, 1975).
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Our last rule is based on truncated Borda scores defined as follows. For some positional
vector n(a) and some real number t ∈ (0,+∞) the truncated Borda score (Fishburn, 1974)
Bt(a) = t · n1(a)+(t−1)n2(a)+ . . .+(t−btc)nbtc+1(a), t ∈ (0,+∞),
where formally put ni(a) = 0 for i > m. The definition implies that Bm−1(a) = Bo(a).
Now we can define a modification of a standard median voting rule (Sertel and Yılmaz,
1999): the convex median voting rule (CM) (Kondratev, 2018). Instead of the standard
sequence n1(a), n1(a) + n2(a), n1(a) + n2(a) + n3(a), . . . we use the truncated Borda scores.
If n1(a) > n/2 for some candidate a then this candidate is the winner. Otherwise, for each
candidate a define the score of the convex median using the following formula:
CM(a) = max
{
t ≥ 1 : Bt(a)
t
≤ n
2
}
,
and the winner is the candidate with the lowest value of the convex median.
We complete this section with one more desirable criterion.
Second-order positional dominance (2-PD) (Stein et al., 1994). Whenever candi-
date a obtains a higher score than candidate b for all convex scoring rules then candidate b
is not included in the choice set.
3. Results
3.1. Majority-Consistent Voting Rules. This subsection considers the voting rules that
satisfy the majority criterion (thus, they satisfy (q, k)-majority criterion with k = 1 and
any q ≥ 1/2) but do not satisfy the mutual majority criterion.18 In the case of only two
candidates, each rule satisfying the majority criterion coincides with the simple majority
rule where the winner is the candidate that gets at least half the votes.19 In what follows
we consider the case of m > 2 candidates.
For the voting rules, below we find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
(q, k,m)-majority criterion is satisfied. First we determine the tight bounds for the plurality
rule, Simpson’s rule, Young’s rule and the Condorcet least-reversal rule.
18For completeness of results, we should mention well-studied voting rules that satisfy the mutual majority
criterion. These are the Condorcet extensions: Nanson’s (1882), see also McLean and Urken (1995), Bald-
win’s (1926), maximal likelihood (Kemeny, 1959), ranked pairs (Tideman, 1987), Schulze’s (2011), successive
elimination (see e.g., Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2018), and those tournament solutions which are refinements
of the top cycle (Good, 1971; Schwartz, 1972); other rules include the single transferable vote (Hare, 1859),
Coombs’ (1964), Bucklin’s (see e.g., Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2018), median voting rule (Bassett and Persky,
1999), majoritarian compromise (Sertel and Yılmaz, 1999), q-approval fallback bargaining (Brams and Kil-
gour, 2001). For their formal definitions and properties, we also advise Brandt et al. (2016), Felsenthal and
Nurmi (2018), Fischer et al. (2016), Taylor (2005), Tideman (2006), and Zwicker (2016).
19In case of only m = 2 candidates the simple majority rule is the most natural as it satisfies a number of
other important axioms according to May’s Theorem (1952).
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Theorem 1. For each m > k ≥ 1, the plurality rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion if
and only if q ≥ k/(k + 1).
Theorem 2. For each m > k > 1, Simpson’s rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion if and
only if q ≥ (k − 1)/k.20
Theorem 3. For each m > k > 1, Young’s rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion if and
only if q ≥ (k − 1)/k.
Theorem 4. For each m > k ≥ 2 and for each even k, the Condorcet least-reversal rule
satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion if and only if q ≥ (5k− 2)/(8k); for each m > k ≥ 1 and
for each odd k, the rule satisfies the criterion if and only if q ≥ (5k2 − 2k + 1)/(8k2).
A few peculiarities can be observed regarding the results above. For the plurality rule,
Simpson’s rule, Young’s rule, and the Condorcet least-reversal rule, the minimal size of the
qualified mutual majority q(k,m) depends on the number of preferred candidates k but does
not depend on the total number of candidatesm. Theorem 4 shows that the Condorcet least-
reversal rule is, perhaps surprisingly, very close to satisfying the mutual majority criterion
as it satisfies 5/8-mutual majority criterion. At the other extreme, the plurality rule gives
the highest non-trivial minimal quota for a given k > 1 among all studied voting rules.
Interestingly, both Simpson’s rule and Young’s rule have the same minimal quota q for
each number of preferred candidates k and each total number of candidates m. This is the
only such coincidence among all the rules that we consider.
Next, we determine the tight bounds for the plurality with runoff and Black’s rule.
Theorem 5. For each m − 1 = k ≥ 1, the plurality with runoff rule satisfies (q, k,m)-
majority criterion if and only if q ≥ 1/2; for each m − 1 > k > 1, the rule satisfies the
criterion if and only if q ≥ k/(k + 2).
Theorem 6. For each m > k > 1, Black’s rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion if and
only if q ≥ (2m− k − 1)/(2m).
Theorem 6 actually finds the tight bound of quota for the Borda rule. In particular,
in case k = 1, this quota equals q = (m − 1)/m, and was also calculated by Baharad and
Nitzan (2002), Nitzan (2009).
Theorem 7. For each m > 2k, the convex median voting rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority
criterion if and only if q ≥ (3k − 1)/(4k); for each m = k + 1 – if and only if q ≥ 1/2; for
20This tight bound q = (k − 1)/k for Simpson’s rule coincides with the tight bound of the q-majority
equilibrium (Greenberg, 1979; Kramer, 1977), and with the minimal quota, that guarantees the acyclicity of
preferences (Craven, 1971; Ferejohn and Grether, 1974; Usiskin, 1964).
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Table 3. Measuring majority power: for a given k, the minimal quota q such
that (q, k)-majority criterion is satisfied
Voting rule k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k > 1 supk q
Instant-runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
CLR (even k) 0.500 0.563 (5k − 2)/(8k) 0.625
CLR (odd k) 0.500 0.556 (5k2 − 2k + 1)/(8k2) 0.625
Convex median 0.500 0.625 0.667 0.688 (3k − 1)/(4k) 0.750
RV 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.667 k/(k + 2) 1.000
Simpson’s 0.500 0.500 0.667 0.750 (k − 1)/k 1.000
Young’s 0.500 0.500 0.667 0.750 (k − 1)/k 1.000
Plurality 0.500 0.667 0.750 0.800 k/(k + 1) 1.000
Black’s 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Proportional veto 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Borda 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Inverse plurality 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The following notations are used: CLR – Condorcet least-reversal rule, RV – plurality with runoff
rule. The voting rules are ordered according to the minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q for
k > 4. For majority-consistent rules q = 1/2 whenever k = 1. The instant-runoff voting satisfies the mutual
majority criterion and therefore q = 1/2 for each k.
each 2k ≥ m > k + 1, the tight bound q satisfies the inequality 1
2
< q < 3k−1
4k
and also the
equation
(4) 4k(m− k − 1)q2 + (5k2 + 5k − 2mk −m2 +m)q +m(m− 1− 2k) = 0.
Let us briefly motivate the results for the convex median voting rule. The Borda rule
satisfies second-order positional dominance (2-PD) but it fails the majority criterion. The
convex median voting rule was proposed by Kondratev (2018) as a rule that satisfies both
2-PD and the majority criterion. Theorem 7 shows that this rule is much closer to satisfying
the stronger criterion of the mutual majority as it satisfies 3/4-mutual majority criterion.
For Dodgson’s rule, below we find sufficient conditions. Necessary and sufficient conditions
remain an open question.
Theorem 8. For m > k ≥ 1, Dodgson’s rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority criterion with
q ≥ k/(k + 1); the rule fails the criterion with q < (5k − 2)/(8k) in the case of evens k ≥ 2,
and q < (5k2 − 2k + 1)/(8k2) in the case of odds k ≥ 1.
The summary of the results from this subsection (Theorem 1 to 7) is presented in Fig. 1.
We can only partially order the voting rules with respect to majority power when the total
number of candidates m and the number of preferred candidates k are not specified. The
minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q(k,m) weakly increases along the arrows.
Using the (q, k)-majority criterion we get a complete order of the voting rules, as is shown
in Table 3. The voting rules are ordered based on the quota q from those with the highest
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majority power to those with the lowest whenever the number of preferred candidates k > 4.
When k = 1, the quota for majority-consistent rules equals 0.5. (The proportional veto core,
the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule do not satisfy the majority criterion and have
quota 1.) As k increases and the mutual majority’s preferences over the preferred candidates
might become more diverse, the minimal quota q also weakly increases. The rate of this
increase varies among the rules and for a small k ∈ {2, 3, 4} the order of the rules varies as
well.
3.2. Majority-Inconsistent Voting Rules. In this subsection we present the results of
the proportional veto core and scoring voting rules.
Theorem 9. For each m > k ≥ 1, the proportional veto core satisfies (q, k,m)-majority
criterion if and only if q ≥ (m− k)/m.
The result above is not surprising because forcing the selection of one of the k most
preferred candidates is equivalent to the vetoing of m− k least preferred candidates. Hence,
any voting rule which selects from the proportional veto core also satisfies Theorem 9.21
Also, this subsection generalizes Theorem 1 for the plurality rule (s1 = 1, s2 = . . . = sm =
0) and Theorem 6 for the Borda rule (si = m− i, i = 1, . . . ,m).
Theorem 10. For each m > k ≥ 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority
criterion if and only if the quota q satisfies the next inequality
(5) q ≥
s1 − 1k
k∑
i=1
sm−i+1
s1 − 1k
k∑
i=1
sm−i+1 + 1k
k∑
i=1
si − sk+1
.
For each m > 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies the majority loser criterion22 if and
only if the next inequality holds
(6) s1 − s2 + . . .+ sm
m− 1 ≤
s1 + . . .+ sm−1
m− 1 − sm.
In particular, in case k = 1, the inequality (5) is23
q ≥ s1 − sm
s1 − sm + s1 − s2 ,
and was also calculated by Baharad and Nitzan (2002), Nitzan (2009).
In particular, in case k = 1 and q = 1/2, we receive the inequality sm ≥ s2. Thus, for
each m > 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies the majority criterion if and only if this rule
21Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 9, one can check that voting rules implemented by
sequential voting by veto (Mueller, 1978; Moulin, 1982, 1983; Felsenthal and Machover, 1992) have the same
tight bound on the size of the qualified mutual majority q.
22Equivalently, the absolute majority loser paradox never occurs.
23Equivalently, q-majority consistency (aka q-majority decisiveness) is satisfied.
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Table 4. Minimal quota q such that (q, k,m)-majority criterion is satisfied
m = 3 m = 3 m = 4 m = 4 m = 4
Voting rule k = 1 k = 2 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Instant-runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Condorcet least-reversal 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.556
Convex median 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.593 0.500
Plurality with runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Simpson’s 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.667
Young’s 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.667
Plurality 0.500 0.667 0.500 0.667 0.750
Black’s 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.625 0.500
Proportional veto 0.667 0.333 0.750 0.500 0.250
Borda 0.667 0.500 0.750 0.625 0.500
Inverse plurality 1.000 0.333 1.000 1.000 0.250
Notes: The voting rules are ordered as in Table 3. We highlight the instances of quotas that are different
from 0.5.
is equivalent to the plurality rule (s1 > s2 = . . . = sm). This fact was also established by
Lepelley (1992), Sanver (2002).
In particular, in case m = 3, the inequality (6) was established, for example, by Diss et al.
(2018).
For the inverse plurality rule (s1 = . . . = sm−1 = 1, sm = 0), Theorem 10 directly implies
the next statement.
Theorem 11. For each m − 1 > k ≥ 1 and for each q < 1, the inverse plurality rule fails
(q, k,m)-majority criterion; for each m − 1 = k ≥ 1, the rule satisfies (q, k,m)-majority
criterion if and only if q ≥ 1/m.
Note that for the inverse plurality rule and the proportional veto core the minimal quota q
may be below one half. For the inverse plurality rule, this occurs whenever the number of
preferred candidates k equals the total number of candidates m minus one, which is the same
as saying that one candidate is vetoed by the mutual majority. We present the analysis of
the veto power in the next subsection.
Theorems 9 and 10 extend the class of voting rules that we can compare using the minimal
quota q, yet this comparison should be made for a specific number of candidates m (as for
most monotonic scoring rules (q, k)-majority criterion gives the same tight quota q = 1).
Thus, we have to use the (q, k,m)-majority criterion. Table 4 presents this comparison for
the majority-consistent voting rules that we considered earlier, the proportional veto core,
the Borda rule, and the inverse plurality rule when the total number of candidates m = 3, 4.
We see that for majority-consistent voting rules (except the plurality rule), when m, k are
small, most of the values of the minimal quota q is equal to 0.5. Interestingly, whenever
MEASURING MAJORITY POWER AND VETO POWER OF VOTING RULES 17
m ≤ 4 (Table 4) or k ≤ 2 (Table 3), the plurality with runoff rule has exactly the same
minimal quotas q = 0.5 as the instant-runoff voting.
We can illustrate the results for the Borda rule and the plurality rule using Example 1
presented in Table 2. Candidates a and b are the two (k = 2) preferred candidates among
the total of four (m = 4) candidates, supported by the mutual majority of 57% voters.
This value is below the minimal quota for the Borda rule (q = 0.625) and the plurality rule
(q = 0.667), and thus these rules might not select a or b. In our example both rules select
candidate c.
3.3. Veto Power. The criteria that we presented above for majority power also allow us to
state a somewhat opposite research question, that is, of veto power. Specifically: how large
should a group of voters be in order to be able to block its l least preferred candidates?
This problem is dual to the problem of finding the minimal quota for the mutual majority
that has k = m − l preferred candidates. Thus, we can immediately compute the minimal
quota of such a group as in the (q,m− l,m)-majority criterion.24
Let us define the veto criterion formally. For a given quota q and a given number of the
least preferred candidates l, we say that a rule satisfies the (q, l)-veto criterion if it satisfies
the (q,m− l,m)-majority criterion for each m.
Overall, when we compare the rules based on the veto criterion from the most veto-
preserving to the least, we get a partial order (the same as for (q, k,m)-majority criterion,
see Fig. 1). However, when we compare the rules based on (q, l)-veto criterion, that is, for
an arbitrary total number of candidates m, we get a complete order for l > 2 as shown in
Table 5. In case l = 1 this order is different and is very peculiar, as we discuss below.
When l = 1, our results highlight the inverse plurality rule as the rule that respects the
minorities the most: its minimal quota is q = 1/m. The previous literature arrived at the
same conclusion by comparing only the monotonic scoring rules (Baharad and Nitzan, 2005,
2007a,b). We extend the comparison to non-scoring rules and confirm this consensus when
l = 1.
However, when l > 1, we arrive at the opposite conclusion. In this case, the minimal
quota q for inverse plurality rule jumps to 1 and thus no group of voters (except the entire
set) can veto l > 1 candidates (see Table 4 where k = m − l, Table 5, and Theorem 11).
The reason is that unless the group coordinates, some of the l candidates may receive a very
small number of lowest positions.
Comparing the results for the veto criterion in Table 5 with the quotas for the (q, k)-
majority criterion in Table 3 we see that voting rules differ in their power for the most
24Previously, the concept of veto power in voting was introduced by Baharad and Nitzan (2005, 2007b) for
settings with l = 1 and by Moulin (1981, 1982, 1983) for settings with an arbitrary l. Their concepts are
also based on the worst-case analysis but are different from ours in that they involve strategic voting.
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Table 5. Measuring veto power: for a given l, the minimal quota q such that
the (q, l)-veto criterion is satisfied
Voting rule l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l > 3 supl q
Instant-runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Condorcet least reversal 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
Convex median 0.500 0.593 0.640 0.667 (3l − 4)/(4l − 4) 0.750
Black’s 0.500 0.625 0.700 0.750 (2l + 1)/(2l + 4) 1.000
Proportional veto 0.333 0.667 0.750 0.800 l/(l + 1) 1.000
Borda 0.500 0.667 0.750 0.800 l/(l + 1) 1.000
Inverse plurality 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Plurality with runoff 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Simpson’s 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Young’s 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Plurality 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The total number of candidates m ≥ 3. The voting rules are ordered according to the minimal size
of the qualified mutual majority q for l > 2 least preferred candidates. For majority loser-consistent rules
q ≤ 1/2 whenever l = 1. The instant-runoff voting satisfies the mutual majority criterion and therefore
q = 1/2 for each l.
preferred candidates and the least preferred candidates. Overall, the order of rules remains
the same except for the proportional veto core, Black’s rule, the Borda rule, and the inverse
plurality rule. These rules perform better when a group of voters need to veto a candidate,
rather than make him win.
Surprisingly, the proportional veto core does not give the highest veto power according
to the (q, l)-veto criterion. This is because for each given number of the least preferred
candidates l the worst case arises when the total number of candidates m = l + 1. In this
case voters need to veto all but one candidate, which is the same as forcing the win of the
remaining candidate.
The situation changes if we restrict our analysis to the case l ≤ m/2 (see Table 6), that is,
when one can veto only her bottom half of the candidates. Comparing the results in Table 5
and Table 6 we see that only the proportional veto core changes its relative position and has
the highest opportunities to veto not more than half the candidates.
3.4. Other Criteria and Tradeoffs. In this subsection, we discuss the tradeoffs between
the (q, k)-majority criterion, the (q, l)-veto criterion, and other criteria from the literature.
For the general classes of voting rules, satisfying the mutual majority criterion (aka
(1/2, k)-majority criterion with arbitrary k) is not a concern. For instance, among Condorcet-
consistent rules we can highlight the ranked pairs rule introduced by Tideman (1987) and
Schulze’s rule (2011), among iterated positional rules – the instant-runoff voting, among
positional rules – the median voting rule (Bassett and Persky, 1999), Bucklin’s method (see
e.g., Tideman, 2006), and the majoritarian compromise (Sertel and Yılmaz, 1999).
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Table 6. Measuring veto power: for a given l, the minimal quota q such that
the (q,m− l,m)-majority criterion is satisfied whenever l ≤ m/2 and m ≥ 3
Voting rule l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l > 3 supl q
Proportional veto 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Instant-runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Condorcet least-reversal 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
Convex median 0.500 0.593 0.640 0.667 −7+3l+
√
17−10l+9l2
8l−8 0.750
Black’s 0.500 0.625 0.667 0.688 (3l − 1)/(4l) 0.750
Borda 0.500 0.625 0.667 0.688 (3l − 1)/(4l) 0.750
Inverse plurality 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Plurality with runoff 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Simpson’s 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Young’s 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Plurality 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The total number of candidates m ≥ 3. The voting rules are ordered according to the minimal size
of the qualified mutual majority q for l > 2 least preferred candidates. For majority loser-consistent rules
q ≤ 1/2 whenever l = 1. The instant-runoff voting satisfies the mutual majority criterion and therefore
q = 1/2 for each l. Under the proportional veto core any simple majority can veto half the candidates and
therefore q = 1/2 for each l > 1.
In contrast, for monotonic scoring rules the (q, k)-majority criterion is often out of reach.
Each scoring rule does not satisfy (1/2, k)-majority criterion for some k. However, for each
fixed k, the scoring rule with the scores s1 = . . . = sk = 1, sk+1 = . . . = sm = 0 satisfies
(1/2, k)-majority criterion. Below, we consider the tradeoffs for scoring rules in more detail.
For a given voting rule, we can see the tradeoff between majority power (including the
majority criterion, and the mutual majority criterion), veto power (including the majority
loser criterion), and other criteria from its axiomatic characterizations.
Baharad and Nitzan (2005) prove that the inverse plurality rule is the only non-generalized
scoring rule that satisfies the minimal veto criterion.25 Though their minimal veto criterion
involves strategic candidates and is different from ours, it shows that the quota q = 1/m (for
the case of l = 1 least preferred candidates) characterizes the inverse plurality rule. This
implies that the (q, k)-majority criterion is never satisfied (for each fixed k, the minimal
quota q for the inverse plurality rule equals 1).
The plurality rule is the only non-generalized scoring rule that satisfies the majority cri-
terion (Lepelley, 1992; Sanver, 2002). This implies that if a non-generalized scoring rule
25The fundamental characterization of the class of generalized and non-generalized scoring rules was in-
troduced by Smith (1973) and Young (1975). They use the criteria of universality, anonimity, neutrality,
and consistency (aka reinforcement) for the generalized scoring rules, and additionally the continuity (aka
Archimedean) criterion for the non-generalized scoring rules. Characterizations of specific scoring rules usu-
ally involve the fundamental result above; see Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) for a review and Richelson
(1978) and Ching (1996) for the case of the plurality rule.
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satisfies the (1/2, 1)-majority criterion for k = 1 then for any given k the minimal quota is
necessarily q = k/(k + 1).
Sanver (2002) and Woeginger (2003) prove that a generalized scoring rule cannot simul-
taneously satisfy the majority criterion and the majority loser criterion. This tradeoff can
be illustrated by the plurality rule, the Borda rule, and the inverse plurality rule. While the
plurality rule satisfies the majority criterion, it fails the majority loser criterion. In contrast,
the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule satisfy the majority loser criterion and hence
fail the majority criterion.
Other impossibility results involving the majority criterion and the majority loser criterion
can be found in Theorem 4.2 in Kondratev (2018). Among 37 different criteria only the
second-order positional dominance (2-PD) is resistant to the 1/2-mutual majority criterion.
Specifically, there is no rule that satisfies both the 2-PD and 1/2-mutual majority criteria.
This impossibility is easy to see from the preference profile in Table 2. Here, candidates a
and b are supported by a mutual majority of 57% of voters. However, candidate c obtains a
higher score than candidates a, b for all convex scoring rules, i.e., c second-order positionally
dominates a, b.
We can generalize the latter result from the 1/2-mutual majority criterion to the (q, k)-
majority criterion for any given k. The next theorem establishes the tradeoff between 2-PD
and (q, k)-majority criterion.
Theorem 12. 1) If k ≥ 1 and q < 2k/(3k + 1) then there is no rule that satisfies the
second-order positional dominance and (q, k)-majority criteria;
2) There exists a rule that satisfies both criteria for each k ≥ 1 and each q ≥ 2k/(3k + 1).26
This theorem also shows that the 2-PD and q-mutual majority criteria are compatible if
and only if q ≥ 2/3.
4. Concluding Remarks
We introduced and studied the quantitative properties of voting rules which we call the
(q, k)-majority criterion and the (q, l)-veto criterion. These criteria allow us to study how
decisive each voting rule is, that is, to what extent a voting rule respects majority power
and/or veto power.
Our criteria form a partial order over the studied voting rules (see Fig. 1). In general, the
rule with a higher majority power also has a higher veto power. The instant-runoff voting
has the highest majority power and veto power, while the plurality rule appears to have a
relatively low level of majority power and veto power (see tables 3, 5, 6).
26The rule constructed in the proof of Theorem 12 does not satisfy the criteria of the Condorcet loser,
majority loser, and reversal symmetry. In contrast, the convex median voting rule satisfies these three
criteria (Kondratev, 2018) but has a higher tight bound of the size of qualified mutual majority according
to Theorem 7.
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Our results give several new insights and raise a number of open questions; we briefly list
them below.
Minority protection. Somewhat surprisingly, the inverse plurality rule (aka the anti-
plurality rule or negative voting) also gives low veto power while it was previously assumed
to give minorities the highest veto power (Baharad and Nitzan, 2005, 2007a,b). This dis-
crepancy comes from the fact that veto power was previously assumed to be used against
only one least preferred candidate, l = 1. In this case our results agree with the literature,
while when l > 1 we show that the inverse plurality rule may require the entire set of voters,
q = 1, to veto these l candidates (see Theorem 11 and tables 5, 6). An open question here is
whether this peculiarity of the inverse plurality rule also occurs in the strategic framework
of Baharad and Nitzan (2002, 2007b) and Moulin (1981, 1982, 1983).
For each specific setting (fixed number of preferred candidates and the total number of
candidates) the partial order becomes complete. Surprisingly, in the complete orders the
direct relation between the majority power and the veto power disappears. Specifically, the
proportional veto core, the Borda rule, and Black’s rule have lower majority power than
the plurality rule (see Table 3), but at the same time they have a higher veto power than
the plurality with runoff (see tables 5, 6). This is possible since the three rules are not
comparable with the plurality rule and the plurality with runoff in the partial order (see
Fig. 1). Thus, the proportional veto core, the Borda rule, and Black’s rule are, perhaps, the
best rules to protect minorities.
Among the three rules, Black’s rule seems to have a more distinguished set of properties.
From a theoretical point of view, the first stage of Black’s rule, the Condorcet rule (aka
pairwise majority rule), works well because it is strategy-proof in a large domain (Campbell
and Kelly, 2003) and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Dasgupta and
Maskin, 2008; Miller, 2018). Statistically, Black’s rule is much less manipulable than the
Borda rule (Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999; Aleskerov et al., 2012; Green-Armytage et al.,
2016), however, the Borda rule provides a slightly higher social utility efficiency (Merrill,
1984). In three-candidate elections, Black’s rule encounters voting paradoxes with lower
frequencies (Plassmann and Tideman, 2014) and selects the “best” candidate with higher
frequencies (Tideman and Plassmann, 2014). In real elections, however, both rules mostly
select the same candidate despite the fact that a Condorcet winner usually exists (Feld and
Grofman, 1992).
The proportional veto core consistently gives the highest veto power to minorities whenever
they have a mutual dislike of no more than half the candidates (see Theorem 9 and Table 6).
However the practical use of this rule is limited since it is not easy to compute even for a
small total number of candidates, it often selects more than one winner and it is extremely
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manipulable. Finding a practical rule that consistently gives the highest veto power to
minorities is still an open question.
Tradeoffs. We find that (q, k)-majority criterion is compatible with various standard
desirable properties for voting rules. The only exception is the second-order positional domi-
nance criterion. For each q < 2k/(3k+1), Theorem 12 shows that each rule that satisfies the
second-order positional dominance criterion does not satisfy the (q, k)-majority criterion.
Condorcet and Dodgson. Our results highlight the distinction between different Con-
dorcet extensions. Most of the Condorcet-consistent rules satisfy the mutual majority crite-
rion (see footnote 18), and we study several important exceptions: Condorcet least-reversal,
and the methods of Black, Young, Simpson, and Dodgson.
One specific open question arises from the incomplete result regarding Dodgson’s rule: in
contrast to other results, Theorem 8 does not specify the tight bound on the quota. The
value of the tight bound seems to be a hard question, as Dodgson’s rule is known to be
difficult to work with (Bartholdi et al., 1989; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Hemaspaandra et al.,
1997). It is not easy to check whether the profile in Table 7 (which we use for the proofs in
the Appendix) gives the worst case for each candidate in the group of mutually supported
candidates and, at the same time, the best case for some other candidate outside the group.
Limitations of our approach. Our criteria do not provide a comparison for voting
rules that satisfy the mutual majority criterion: all such rules have the same high level of
majority power and veto power. In fact, all our results for the instant-runoff voting hold
for an arbitrary voting rule that satisfies the mutual majority criterion. Designing a proper
quantitative criteria that would distinguish these rules is an open question.
Another question is generalizing our criteria of majority power and veto power to the
framework of multi-winner elections, as, for instance, done to a proportionality degree in
Lackner and Skowron (2018) and Skowron (2018). Similarly, an important open question
is whether analogous criteria for grading systems–such as approval voting (Brams, 2009) as
well as majority judgment (Balinski and Laraki, 2011)–should be developed.
A more general open question is the analysis of majority power and veto power in practically-
relevant scenarios. In this paper the main results are based on the worst-case analysis as it
allows us to provide precise estimates for any total number of candidates. Future research
can make use of more realistic scenarios inspired by theories of individual decision-making,
empirical results, and experiments on voting. A particularly developed approach is the one
that measures the statistical properties of voting rules, such as Condorcet efficiency (Gehrlein
and Lepelley, 2017), majority winner and majority loser efficiency (Diss et al., 2018), ma-
nipulability (Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999; Aleskerov et al., 2012; Green-Armytage et al.,
2016), and others.
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In studying majority power and veto power one is not restricted to single-winner elec-
tions where a representative or a ruler is selected. Alternative ways to protect minorities
range from using two periods of voting (Fahrenberger and Gersbach, 2010), allowing storable
votes in multi-issue elections (Casella, 2005), direct democracy, participatory budgeting (Ca-
bannes, 2004), and multi-winner elections.
Resume. As a final takeaway, our results suggest that societies that care about the rights
of the majority to make their most preferred candidates win and veto their least preferred
candidates should adopt the instant-runoff voting. In contrast, societies that care about the
rights of minorities should select Black’s rule.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than nk/(k+ 1) voters give candidates from some subset B ( A
(m > |B| = k ≥ 1) top k positions. Then, together, all candidates in B receive strictly more
than nk/(k + 1) top positions, while candidates from A \B all together receive strictly less
than n/(k+ 1) top positions. Therefore, at least one of the candidates in B receives strictly
more than n/(k+1) top positions, and each candidate from A \B receives strictly less than
n/(k+1) top positions. Therefore, the plurality rule can only select a candidate from set B.
For any smaller quota q < k/(k + 1) we can always find the following counterexample.
Let the total number of voters be n = k+ 1 and let k voters give candidates from set B top
k positions such that each of these candidates gets the top position exactly once. Let the
other voter give the top position to some other candidate a /∈ B. Then, the plurality rule
selects all candidates from the set B ∪ a.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Let m ≥ 3, and more than n(k − 1)/k voters top-rank k ≥ 2 candidates, denote this
subset of candidates as B = {b1, . . . , bk}. It is easy to see that each candidate in A \B gets
less than n/k of Simpson’s scores (a candidate from A \ B gets the highest score when it is
top-ranked by all voters that do not top-rank B).
Denote the number of first positions of some candidate b ∈ B among all other candidates
in B as n1(b, B):
(7) n1(b, B) = |{i : b i b′ for all b′ ∈ B \ b}|.
Since the total number of first positions is fixed n1(b1, B) + . . .+ n1(bk, B) = n, there is a
candidate b ∈ B with a weakly higher number of top positions than average: n1(b, B) ≥ n/k.
Hence, there is a candidate that receives not less than n/k of scores, and each candidate
from A \B gets less than n/k scores and cannot be the winner.
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To see that the bound q = (k − 1)/k is tight consider the following counterexample in
Table 7: each candidate b ∈ B receives exactly qn/k first positions, qn/k second positions,
and so on from the qualified mutual majority of qn voters, while all voters outside the
qualified mutual majority top-rank some other candidate a1 and also prefer all candidates
in A \B over candidates in B.
Table 7. Preference profile
qn
k
. . . qn
k
(1−q)n
k
. . . (1−q)n
k
b1 . . . bk a1 . . . a1
b2 . . . b1 . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . am−k . . . am−k
bk . . . bk−1 b1 . . . bk
a1 . . . a1 . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . bk−1 . . . bk−2
am−k . . . am−k bk . . . bk−1
Notes: The qualified mutual majority of qn voters give exactly qn/k first, second, and so on positions to
each candidate bi ∈ B, all preferences over remaining alternatives A \ B are the same. The other (1 − q)n
voters prefer each candidate in A \ B over each candidate in B, but have a relative orderings within these
two sets B and A \ B that is identical to the former qn voters. This type of cyclical preferences over B is
known as a Condorcet k-tuple.
For each k>1 we can set n=k2 and q=(k−1)/k. Then, set B is supported by n(k−1)/k
voters, while each candidate from the set B ∪ a1 gets the same Simpson’s score.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than n(k − 1)/k voters top-rank k ≥ 2 candidates, and denote
this subset of candidates as B = {b1, . . . , bk}. We consider the next two cases separately.
Case 1. [n/k] = n/k, where [ ] is the integer part.
In this case, not more than [n/k]− 1 voters give the first positions to the candidates from
the set A \ B. For each candidate from A \ B to make him a weak Condorcet winner, we
need to remove at least n− 2([n/k]− 1) = n− 2[n/k] + 2 voters.
Consider some candidate b ∈ B with a higher than average number of top positions
n1(b, B) ≥ n/k = [n/k] (as defined in equation (7)). For b to win, at most n− 2[n/k] voters
have to be removed.
Case 2. [n/k] < n/k, where [ ] is the integer part.
In this case, not more than [n/k] voters give the first positions to the candidates from the
set A \ B. For each candidate from A \ B to make him a weak Condorcet winner, we need
to remove at least n− 2[n/k] voters.
Consider some candidate b ∈ B with a higher than average number of top positions
n1(b, B) ≥ n/k > [n/k] (as defined in equation (7)). Thus, n1(b, B) ≥ [n/k] + 1. For b to
win, at most n− 2([n/k] + 1) = n− 2[n/k]− 2 voters have to be removed.
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The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (k − 1)/k is tight.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Again, we use the preference profile in Table 7. Let us first show that it is the worst
possible profile for each candidate b ∈ B to win by the Condorcet least-reversal rule, i.e.,
it has the maximum minimal score pCLRb among all candidates b ∈ B. To maximize the
minimal score pCLR for candidates in B we can maximize the scores (1) for the subset B
separately:
∑
c∈B\b
. This is true, because the other part
∑
c∈A\B
is zero whenever q ≥ 1/2.
According to Proposition 5 in Saari (2000), each tournament matrix with k candidates has
unique representation as the sum of its transitive matrix and its Condorcet k-tuple matrix
(Table 8).27
Table 8. Condorcet k-tuple profile and tournament matrix
n
k
n
k
. . . n
k
b1 b2 . . . bk
b2 b3 . . . b1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
bk b1 . . . bk−1
b1 b2 . . . bk
b1 n(k − 1)/k . . . n/k
b2 n/k . . . 2n/k
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bk n(k − 1)/k n(k − 2)/k . . .
Thus, the maximal element of the transitive matrix gets no more than pCLR total scores
in the k-tuple matrix only. Hence, the profile in Table 7 qualifies as the worst case.
Next, we find the bound for the profile in Table 7. Each candidate a ∈ A \B gets at least
pCLRa ≥ nk(2q − 1)/2 points.
Candidate b1 gets n/k, 2n/k, . . . , (k − 1)n/k pairwise majority wins against candidates
bk, . . . , b2 correspondingly. For even k the score for each b ∈ B is pCLRb = n(k − 2)/8,
for odd k the score is pCLRb = n(k − 1)2/(8k). Setting these scores equal to the score
pCLRa1 = nk(2q − 1)/2 received by a1 we get the tight bounds.
Proof of Theorem 5.
In case k = m− 1 and q = 1/2, in the second round there is at least one candidate from
the supported k candidates, and this candidate wins. For any smaller quota q < 1/2 we can
always construct a counterexample where a majority winner does not belong to the set of k
candidates. This case also includes the case m = 3, k = 2.
Let m > 3, and let more than nk/(k+ 2) voters give candidates from some subset B ( A
(m− 1 > |B| = k > 1) top k positions. Then, all the candidates in B receive strictly more
than nk/(k + 2) top positions, while the candidates from A \B all receive strictly less than
2n/(k + 2) top positions. Therefore, at least one of the candidates in B and at most one
27Tournament matrix h is called transitive if there exists a linear order 0∈ L(A) such that h(a, b) ≥ h(b, a)
whenever a 0 b. For example, the tournament matrix in Table 2 is transitive with the linear order a 0
b 0 c 0 d.
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of the candidates in A \ B receive strictly more than n/(k + 2) of top positions. Thus, in
the second round there is at least one candidate from set B. Even if the second candidate
is from A \B, this second candidate loses to the candidate from B by simple majority rule.
Hence, the winner is from B.
For any smaller quota q < k/(k+2) we can always find the following counterexample. Let
the total number of voters be n = (k + 2)n′ + 2 and let kn′ voters give k candidates from
set B top k positions such that each candidate in B gets the top position exactly n′ times.
Consider the other 2 · (n′ + 1) voters and two other candidates a1, a2 /∈ B. Let n′ + 1 voters
top-rank candidate a1 and the other n′ + 1 voters top-rank candidate a2. Then, candidates
a1 and a2 make it to the second round.
If we set n′ > 2q/(k − kq − 2q) then set B is supported by more than qn voters.
Proof of Theorem 6.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than qn voters give candidates from some subset B ( A (m >
|B| = k > 1) top k positions. Then one can find the tight bound for the quota q = q(k,m)
using the following equation:
(1− q)(m− 1) + q(m− k − 1) = qm− 1 +m− k
2
+ (1− q)k − 1
2
,
where the left part is the maximal Borda score for any a /∈ B, and the right part is the
minimal possible value for a maximal Borda score within the set B.
The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (2m− k − 1)/(2m) is tight.
Proof of Theorem 7.
Let qn voters give candidates from some subset B = {b1, . . . , bk} top k positions. Then,
each candidate a /∈ B gets the following truncated Borda score with t = 2kq:
B2kq(a)
2kq
≤ (1− q)n+ (2kq − k)qn
2kq
=
n
2
.
Let m > 2k and q > (3k − 1)/(4k). It is sufficient to show that for some b ∈ B its
truncated Borda score is higher: B2kq(b)/(2kq) > n/2. For a contradiction assume that the
truncated Borda score with t = 2kq satisfies the following inequality:
B2kq(b)
2kq
≤ n
2
for each b ∈ B.
Then,
(2kq)n1(b) + . . .+ (2kq − k + 1)nk(b)
2kq
≤ n
2
for each b ∈ B,
whence, after summing up k inequalities, we get:
qnk(4kq − k + 1)
4kq
≤ nk
2
.
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The latter inequality contradicts the assumption q > (3k − 1)/(4k).
To show that the bound is tight we use the preference profile from Table 7.
Similarly, we find a tight bound for the case 2k ≥ m ≥ k + 1:
min

max
b∈B
B2kq(b)
2kq
=
qn
k
(4kq−k+1)
2
k
2kq
+
(1−q)n
k
(4kq−m)
2
(2k −m+ 1)
2kq
=
n
2
,
which leads to equation (4) and also to a special case where m = k + 1, q = 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 8.
Let more than k/(k + 1) of voters give candidates from some subset B top k positions.
Then, each candidate a /∈ B gets less than n/(k + 1) votes in a pairwise comparison to each
candidate from the set B. Upgrading candidate a by one position in the preference profile
adds not more than one vote in a pairwise comparison to each candidate from the set B.
Therefore, candidate a needs more than k(n
2
− n
k+1
) upgrades to become a Condorcet winner.
A candidate from B that gets more than n/(k + 1) top positions does not need more than
(k − 1)(n
2
− n
k+1
) upgrades in the preference profile in order to become a Condorcet winner.
Since (k − 1)(n
2
− n
k+1
) < k(n
2
− n
k+1
), Dodgson’s rule selects from set B.
The second statement follows from the calculations for the profile in Table 7.
Proof of Theorem 9.
From the definition of proportional veto core it follows that for each k,m and q = (m −
k)/m this rule satisfies the (q, k,m)-majority criterion.
We prove by contradiction. Assume that the rule satisfies the criterion for some k,m and
q < (m − k)/m. Then, we can always construct a profile (because the number of voters is
arbitrary) such that 0 < ε < −q + (m− k)/m and:
i) −ε+ (m− k)/m of voters give to some candidates {b1, . . . , bk} the highest k positions;
ii) other ε+ k/m of voters give to these k candidates the lowest k positions.
Condition i) and the assumption imply that the choice set is included in the set {b1, . . . , bk}.
Condition ii) implies that none of these k candidates can win. Hence, the assumption is false
and the bound q = (m− k)/m is tight.
Proof of Theorem 10.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than qn voters give candidates from some subset B ( A (m >
|B| = k ≥ 1) top k positions. One can then find the tight bound for the quota q =
q(k, s1, . . . , sm) using the following equation:
(1− q) · s1 + q · sk+1 = q · s1 + . . .+ sk
k
+ (1− q) · sm + . . .+ sm−k+1
k
,
where the left part is the maximal total score for any a /∈ B, and the right part is the minimal
maximal total score for any b ∈ B.
The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (5) is tight.
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In particular, in case k = m− 1 and q = 1/2, we get the inequality (6).
Proof of Theorem 12.
1) Fix any k ≥ 1 and any q < 2k/(3k + 1). To show that the properties 2-PD and
(q, k)-majority criterion are incompatible we use the profile from Table 7.
Let m > 2k and the candidates from the set B = {b1, . . . , bk} constitute a qualified mutual
majority of 2k/(3k+1)−ε with a small ε > 0. Let us show that candidate a1 /∈ B positionally
dominates each candidate b ∈ B according to the second-order positional dominance. It is
equivalent to the inequalities Bt(a1) ≥ Bt(b) for each t = 1, . . . ,m − 1, and Bm−1(a1) >
Bm−1(b) (see Stein et al., 1994; Kondratev, 2018). In our case, it leads to the next obvious
inequalities:
t
(
1− 2k
3k + 1
+ ε
)
>
t(t+ 1)
2k
(
2k
3k + 1
− ε
)
, 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
t
(
1− 2k
3k + 1
+ ε
)
+ (t− k)
(
2k
3k + 1
− ε
)
>
2t− k + 1
2
(
2k
3k + 1
− ε
)
,
k + 1 ≤ t ≤ m− k,
t
(
1− 2k
3k + 1
+ ε
)
+ (t− k)
(
2k
3k + 1
− ε
)
>
2t− k + 1
2
(
2k
3k + 1
− ε
)
+
(t−m+ k + 1)(t−m+ k)
2k
(
1− 2k
3k + 1
+ ε
)
, m− k + 1 ≤ t ≤ m− 1.
2) Let us construct a rule that satisfies the 2-PD and (q, k)-majority criterion for each
k ≥ 1 and each q ≥ 2k/(3k + 1).
If n1(a) > n/2 for some candidate a then this candidate is the winner. Otherwise, for each
candidate a define the next score:
(8) max
{
t ∈ [1,∞] : (3t+ 1)
2(t+ 1)
Bt(a)
t
≤ n
2
}
,
and the winner is the candidate with the lowest score. Note that the functions (3t+1)/(2(t+
1)) and Bt(a)/t are non-decreasing.
Let more than 2k/(3k + 1) of voters give candidates from some subset B = {b1, . . . , bk}
top k positions. Then, we have the next inequality:
(3k + 1)
2(k + 1)
Bk(a)
k
<
n
2
for each a /∈ B,
hence, for each a /∈ B, the score (8) is higher than k.
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It is sufficient to show that for some b ∈ B its score (8) is lower than k. For a contradiction,
assume that we have the following inequality:
(3k + 1)
2(k + 1)
Bk(b)
k
≤ n
2
for each b ∈ B.
Then
(3k + 1)
2(k + 1)
kn1(b) + (k − 1)n2(b) + . . .+ nk(b)
k
≤ n
2
for each b ∈ B,
whence, after summing up k inequalities and using the fact that∑
b∈B
nj(b) >
2kn
3k + 1
for each j = 1, . . . , k,
we receive a contradiction.
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